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Peking: A Policy of Militarisation



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INTRODUCTION

The reader probably knows about European militarism, particularly the German variety, which led to the outbreak of two world wars, causing the death of some 60 million people.

This tragic experience forces us to pay close attention to militarism now emanating from the East—from Peking. There is no doubt that if Peking militarism detonates a third world war, the number of victims will be far greater than in the first two, because this one will be a nuclear war with the use of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. This is why we cannot afford to disregard Peking militarism.

Militarist aspirations, an attempt to solve problems by force of arms, idealization of war—these are conspicuous in the views of the Chinese leaders. "Power grows out of the barrel of a gun," Mao Tse-tung affirmed, and on the basis of this principle he tried to resolve questions relating to the domestic and foreign policy of China. "All things grow out of the barrel of a gun," he added. "Some people speak ironically about us, calling us advocates of the 'theory of the omnipotence of war'."

"Our trump card is war, dictatorship..." Mao Tse-tung told journalists on March 10, 1957.

At the second session of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China held in May 1958, Mao said bluntly: "It won't be all that bad if an atomic war really breaks out: as a result of it capitalism will perish and eternal peace will reign on earth." After Mao's death the militarist torch was taken up by the new Chinese leaders. "We must definitely be ready for war. We cannot let time slip through our fingers, as it waits for no one," declared Hua Kuo-feng in May 1977. His words were echoed by Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Yeh Chien-ying: "We must be clearly aware of this situation, keep war in mind and be prepared for it, be prepared for war breaking out at an early date, be prepared for a big war. We must race against time and work as quickly as possible so that well before the outbreak of war we will have built up industry in the interior."

Addressing the first session of the 5th National People's Congress in February 1978, Hua Kuo-feng repeated the Maoist postulate—"Dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere", and called on the nation to "raise to a new level the work of preparing for war and the work of revolutionising and modernising the army".

Why are the Chinese leaders inclined to use military methods in coping with problems? The answer is to be found, in our view, in the specific historical development of China as well as in the present leadership's peculiar approach to the tasks of the country's development. These two factors are undoubtedly interrelated.

Chinese militarism has deep historical roots. In the history of China the army has always played the role of the leading social force. In Chinese society civilian administration and military admin-

istration were usually headed by the same person—the military commander who was at the same time the feudal lord. A bourgeois historian, Ho Ping-ti, has noted that “the Chinese state always derived its supreme power from the army. And the notion was entrenched in the minds of people that military force played an exclusive role in society”.

The feudal system existed in China until fairly recently. When in the 1920s Mao was making his first moves in the power struggle, China was a dis-united state where local authority was in the hands of feudal militarists who were at loggerheads with one another. It was not until the early 1950s that feudal landownership was abolished in China. But the remnants of feudalism in the ideology of the ruling circles have proved to be more tenacious.

Addressing workers in the field of philosophy in Peking in 1964, Mao Tse-tung described his intellectual evolution as follows: “At first I had a feudal ideology, and afterwards a bourgeois-democratic one.” And although Mao Tse-tung subsequently came to know something about Marxism, his world outlook was a medley of ideas and notions. Those who knew Mao Tse-tung personally have noted his militarist psychology and Bonapartist propensities.

The legacy of the past is seen in China today not only in the ideological sphere but also in the sphere of practice. The organisational structure of the Chinese army to this day bears the marks of the militarist-feudal system: in the People's Republic of China the regular troops are divided into field troops which are subordinate to the centre and local troops which are under the direct command of military district commanders. In addition, there is a people's militia. This system is affirmed in the Chinese Constitution (Article 19). Addressing the National People's Congress in February 1978, Hua

Kuo-feng said: “We must consistently implement the triune system of the armed forces, which combines field troops, local troops and the people's militia.”

The system whereby regular troops are divided into field and local ones reflects the deep contradiction existing between centre and periphery—a contradiction which sometimes has to be resolved by force and bloodshed. That was what happened, for example, in the summer of 1967, in the period of the “cultural revolution”, when Peking had to drop parachute troops in Wuhan in order to pacify the commander of the Wuhan military district, Chen Tsai-tao.

Peking militarism is connected with the hegemonic aspirations of the Chinese leaders, with their ambition to turn China into the principal world power that would dictate its will to other countries. Such aspirations had been more than once spelled out by Mao Tse-tung himself: “We must conquer the globe,” he said in 1959.

The chief means of turning China into a hegemonic power, in the view of the Peking leaders, lies in accelerated development of the country's military potential, above all its nuclear missile forces. That is why the recently revived course of “four modernisations” (of agriculture, industry, military science, and science and technology) gives priority to the army, to which all other matters are subordinated.

At the same time, being aware that China lags far behind other countries, especially in the military sphere, and wishing to close this gap as quickly as possible, the Peking leaders have chosen a road that poses great danger to other countries and peoples—the road of inciting conflicts and provoking a global military clash. Their reasoning is simple enough:

to weaken the main political opponents of China, above all the Soviet Union and the United States, and thereby facilitate the realisation of their own ambitious plans. Thus, Peking's policy of undermining international detente and provoking a world conflict should be regarded as an integral part of its militarist course. The Peking leaders are eagerly waiting for the time when they can dictate their will to a war-enfeebled world.

Militarism has taken deep root in every sphere of life in China. The "ideal" military man, one who blindly carries out all the orders of his commander and who is ready to kill at the first order, has been raised to a cult, and the Chinese are told to regard him as a "model". "Model soldiers" and "model companies"—such expressions indicate the military orientation of Chinese society today.

The organisation of work in industry and agriculture, the strictly controlled daily life of the Chinese, constant surveillance over their way of thinking—all this very much reminds one of army life and it is turning Chinese society into one huge army unit ready to carry out any command.

The new Chinese leadership has announced that it will continue the foreign policy mapped out by Mao Tse-tung. Indeed, while certain changes have been carried out in China's domestic policy (the more odious of Mao's "thoughts" have been discarded), no changes are observed in its foreign policy. This cannot but put one on one's guard.

The Chinese leadership openly denounces the relaxation of international tension and speaks ironically of the very word "detente". Peking has participated in the work of the United Nations since 1971, but during all these years it has not only failed to make one single constructive proposal for the strengthening of international security and for disarmament,

but has invariably opposed all such proposals coming from other states. To all such initiatives the Chinese leaders have one short answer: "War is inevitable." And all their practical activities are designed to prove this "inevitability".

CHAPTER I

"DETENTE DOES NOT EXIST, WAR IS INEVITABLE"

Peking: Course Towards War

The Chinese Constitution adopted in January 1975 is perhaps the only constitution in the world which contains a call for making war preparations, and it makes no mention of peace whatsoever.

During the twenty-five years that have passed since the adoption of the first constitution (1954), China's development has been marked by serious contradictions. In the first years following the victory of the revolution the People's Republic of China successfully developed its economy in close cooperation with the socialist states and with their support; new social relations were being consolidated. All these changes were reflected and affirmed in the first constitution (1954) and in the decisions of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China (1956).

At the break of the 1960s, however, the chauvinist line of Mao Tse-tung's grouping, camouflaged in socialist slogans and ultra-revolutionary verbiage, began to prevail in the policy of the Chinese leadership. This is seen in both the domestic and foreign policy of China. The 1954 Constitution of the People's Republic of China was virtually abolished. The new constitution adopted in 1975 differed from it basically.

The 1954 Constitution contains the thesis that "struggle for the noble aims of achieving world

peace and for mankind's progress is the invariable course of our country in international affairs". This thesis is not found in the 1975 Constitution, which proclaimed in the introduction these Maoist directives: "to prepare for war", and "to fight against the policy of aggression and war pursued by imperialism and social-imperialism, against the hegemony of the superpowers". Fabrications about "social-imperialism", by which the Soviet Union is meant, were spread by the Mao group in an attempt to cover up its withdrawal from the socialist community of nations.

After the death of Mao Tse-tung, the first session of the 5th National People's Congress, held in late February and early March, 1978, adopted another "amended" text of the Chinese Constitution.

A comparison of this "amended" text with the section of the 1975 Constitution dealing with foreign policy matters, shows that the Chinese leaders took into account the sharp criticism of the world public which regarded the 1975 Chinese Constitution as a "manifesto of militarism". The new constitution omitted such provisions as "to prepare for war" and "to stimulate preparations for war". But this did not make Peking's policy peaceable; its line as affirmed by the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China remains unchanged—it is inflammatory, provocative, and anti-socialist. Thus, the "amendment" was only a camouflage and did not change the essence of China's foreign policy.

What is more, the 1978 Constitution included for the first time the thesis about "the three worlds", which indicates a hardening of Chinese policy and a further shifting to the right. This addition alone shows that the Peking leaders no longer attempt to present China as a "peace-loving" country.

A provocative anti-Soviet idea about the formation of "a broadest united front against the hegemony of the two superpowers" has also been introduced in the Constitution. First set forth in a report made by Chou En-lai as early as August 1973, at the 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China, this idea appeared in its final version only in the 1978 Constitution.

A proof of the Chinese leadership's continuing drift to the right is that the 1978 Constitution, unlike that of 1975, puts "social-imperialism" in first place, before "imperialism", as the chief target of struggle.

In order to be fully convinced that the 1978 Chinese Constitution does not in the least indicate Peking's abandonment of its policy of provocation, we may compare the provisions and conclusions of the last two congresses of the Communist Party of China—the 10th and 11th—on the basis of which the respective texts of the constitutions of 1975 and 1978 were worked out.

In the report to the 10th Congress (August 1973), which contains a reference to the well-known utterance of Mao Tse-tung, it was noted that "the danger of a new world war still exists, ... but revolution is the main trend in the world today", and that given certain conditions "it will be possible to prevent such a war".¹ At the 11th Congress it was asserted that "alongside the further growth of the factors of revolution, the factors of war are growing" and that "a clash between the superpowers will sooner or later lead to war",² which amounts to saying that a world war is inevitable.

¹ *The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Documents, Special Supplement to China Reconstructs*, November 1973, p. 18.

² *The Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Documents*, Peking, 1977, pp. 63-64.

A similar emphasis on war may be observed in Peking's approach to the question of relaxation of international tension. At the 10th Congress the fact that there was such a relaxation was admitted, though grudgingly: "Relaxation is a temporary and superficial phenomenon." Four years later, at the 11th Congress, the word "detente" was put in inverted commas to indicate that the phenomenon was non-existent as far as the Chinese leaders were concerned.

Apparently encouraged by the thought that "war is inevitable", Hua Kuo-feng described the present international situation as "very good".¹ It is difficult for the Chinese leaders to hide their desire to see our planet enveloped in the flames of war.

Although Peking continued to mention the "two superpowers", it was stated quite bluntly at the 11th Congress that the "main enemy" was the Soviet Union. In his report Hua Kuo-feng said, "the Soviet Union and the United States are the source of a new world war", and added that "Soviet social-imperialism in particular presents the greater danger".²

Attention has been drawn to the fact that the Chinese leaders present the United States as a lamb which is being bullied and threatened by "Soviet social-imperialism". At the 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China the United States was depicted as the weaker enemy which had "started to go downhill" and which "is increasingly on the decline".³ At the 11th Congress it was said

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

² "The 11th Congress", *Peking Review*, No. 35, August 1977, p. 40.

³ *Ibid.*

explicitly that "Soviet social-imperialism is on the offensive and US imperialism is on the defensive", and that the United States "should not be placed on the same footing" with the Soviet Union. By such statements Peking is obviously urging the United States to aggravate its confrontation with the USSR.

Obviously for the purpose of provocation, of late Peking has frequently characterised the United States as a potential target of an attack by the Soviet Union. "The enormous military force of the Soviet Union in the Far East," Peking warns, "is spear-headed against China of course, but to an even greater extent against the United States and Japan."¹

Such slander can to a certain extent poison the international atmosphere, but it cannot hamper the healthy processes taking place on our planet under the impact of world socialism.

The Soviet Union is not threatening anybody and has no intention of attacking anyone. Speaking in Tula on January 18, 1977, Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, solemnly declared: "On behalf of the Party and people I declare: our country will never take the road of aggression, it will never raise the sword against other peoples."

On the other hand, the strength of the Soviet Union and of the whole socialist community has grown to such an extent that the Western powers do not now dare embark on a course of military confrontation. They have been compelled to start learning the language of peaceful coexistence. And

¹ Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Theory About the Division Into the Three Worlds as a Valuable Contribution to Marxism-Leninism, Peking, 1977, p. 57.

if the ultra-reactionary and revenge-seeking circles in the capitalist countries take up some of the provocative theses of Peking, sober-minded politicians in the West prefer businesslike cooperation.

The Peking rulers, who are trying to apply Mao's medieval notions about world development to present-day international relations, are profoundly mistaken if they think that somebody else is going to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them. More likely, it is certain forces in the imperialist camp that are hoping they will be able to push the Chinese into a military clash with the socialist community.

A Provocative Concept

The policy of detente, which is winning growing support in the world because it truly accords with the interests of all nations, is not to the liking of the Peking leaders. They are countering it with all kinds of Maoist "theories". The central place among these "theories" is held by the "three worlds" concept, first formulated in a speech by Teng Hsiao-ping at the special session of the UN General Assembly on April 10, 1974. At the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China this concept was officially endorsed as "a theory advanced by Chairman Mao Tse-tung". On November 1, 1977, the entire issue of the newspaper *Jenminjihpao* was devoted to an article justifying the "three worlds" concept. The concept was included in the new Constitution of the People's Republic of China.

According to the Maoist "theory of the three worlds", the alignment of forces in the world arena is as follows. The Soviet Union and the United States, the "imperialist superpowers", form the "first world". The economically advanced countries, both

capitalist and socialist, form the "second world". The "third world" consists of the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, as well as the economically less developed socialist countries, above all China and Albania. Only to this last group of countries Peking confers the right to be called socialist.

The "three worlds" concept is basically anti-Soviet because it is founded on the slanderous assertion that the USSR is an "imperialist superpower". The whole concept crumbles if this element is removed. Of course the authors of the concept will not agree with this, for their aim is precisely to present the Soviet Union as the "chief enemy" of the rest of the world.

The Peking leaders claim that the USSR is the enemy of the peoples of the "second world", which it allegedly "subjects to control and contemptuous treatment".¹ In exactly the same way it is "the enemy of the peoples of the third world", resorting, jointly with the other "superpower", to "all possible means of effecting control, subversion and interference" in regard to these peoples.²

According to their anti-Soviet, provocative reasoning, the Soviet Union, in comparison with the United States, is the "more malicious, adventuristic, and treacherous imperialism", and it is "the most dangerous source of a world war".³

The Soviet Union, moreover, is said to be the enemy not only of the "second" and "third worlds", but also of the United States—its neighbour in the "first world". This winds up the whole concept: a

¹ Chairman Mao Tse-tung's *Theory About the Division Into the Three Worlds as a Valuable Contribution to Marxism-Leninism*, Peking, 1977, p. 21.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

united anti-Soviet front has already been formed "theoretically" since the USSR is the "enemy" of all nations.

The idea of this united front was expounded by Teng Hsiao-ping, Deputy Premier of the Chinese People's Republic, on October 22, 1977, in an interview with Claude Roussel, President and General Director of France-Presse. "The global military plan contemplated by the Soviet Union must be foiled," Teng declared, "and I hope the whole world will join in this undertaking—the third world, the second and even the first world, that is, the United States."

How freely the Peking pseudo-strategists juggle terms! Their insolence is boundless. They attach labels to different countries as they think fit, separate these countries into hostile camps, and declare war.

Was this not the kind of universal conflict which Mao Tse-tung had in mind when he wrote in his poem in 1965 (incidentally, the poem was not published until January 1, 1976):

Gunfire licks the heavens,
Shells pit the earth

This is one hell of a mess!

"Relaxation is a temporary and superficial phenomenon, and great disorder will continue. Such great disorder is a good thing for the people, not a bad thing," said Chou En-lai at the 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China in August 1973.

Imagine for a moment that instead of toy figurines and brushes for drawing "beautiful" hieroglyphs the Peking rulers were to gain control over real states and nations. They would have brought about "great disorder" in the "world under the heavens", after which everything would have been razed to the ground. Only China, as the Peking leaders hope, would have survived, and it would have

started translating into reality its long-standing dream of building "a finer civilisation on the ruins of the old society".

Let us note in passing that the irresponsible manner in which Peking "divided" the world's nations into "three worlds" caused confusion and embarrassment even among its closest supporters. Shortly after Mao's death, in early November 1976, the Albanian leader, Enver Hoxha, told the 7th Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour that he disagreed with the concept of the "three worlds". Following this there was much disquiet among the overseas Maoist groups, which sometimes call themselves political parties. In fact these groups became split, unable to withstand another political "great leap" to the right undertaken by Peking.

The "three worlds" concept, according to which the "third world" is the "leading force of our time", lays bare Peking's hegemonic designs with respect to the developing countries and betrays its desire to exploit them in the interests of its great-power policy.

Being aware that its flirtation with the developing countries and its attempts to use their prestige and potentialities for its own ends deceive no one and are in fact regarded as evidence of hegemonic ambitions, Peking has tried on several occasions in recent years to dispel such opinions by assuring the world that it does not intend to become a "super-power" and has no hegemonic plans in regard to anybody. In one of the last articles on the "three worlds", dated November 1, 1977, it is said that all assertions to the effect that China "is seeking hegemony in the third world is a lie".¹

¹ Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Theory About the Division Into the Three Worlds as a Valuable Contribution to Marxism-Leninism, p. 54.

Such oaths are no help to Peking. Moreover, the Peking leaders find it hard to explain why they held up the announcement that China belonged to the "third world" until 1971.

This turnabout with respect to the developing countries is not accidental. We may recall that in the 1950s and 1960s Peking tried hard to bring under its influence first the socialist countries and then the national liberation movement, taking an ultra-left stance in so doing. These attempts were a fiasco. And now the Chinese leaders are appealing to what they call the "third world"—not to progressive forces in the developing countries, nor to anti-imperialist circles in the nonalignment movement, but to an amorphous and classless "third world". The reason is that Peking hopes to get support for its anti-Soviet programme from reactionary, pro-imperialist forces in the "third world", from such odious men as Pinochet of Chile and Sadat of Egypt.

However, the main forces which Peking is counting on are the "second world" countries, to be more precise, those which represent the capitalist system. It assures them of the irreversibility of its present anti-Soviet course in the hope of obtaining from them the military and technical aid that would turn China into the leading world power.

At the same time the Chinese leaders and propagandists have been trying to convince these countries that they are "under the threat of aggression" stemming from the socialist states, especially the Soviet Union. Peking keeps telling the Western European nations that "as soon as war breaks out, they will inevitably be the first target of attack by the Soviet Union".¹

¹ *Jenminjhpao*, January 18, 1978.

Such predictions show that the "three worlds" concept is not only anti-Soviet and hegemonic, but blatantly provocative.

Why the USSR is "Enemy Number One"

Peking calls for "struggle against the two super-powers", but it realises well enough that it cannot cope with both of them at once. So it tries to follow the old feudal formula: first unite with A and defeat B, and then get even with A.

But why should the USSR, and not the United States, be labelled "Enemy Number One"? In other words, why is anti-Sovietism given priority over everything else?

There are several reasons for this, not the least of them being the hope that the Western countries could be incited to an open confrontation with the forces of socialism. Anti-Sovietism is like a password that opens the door to military deliveries and technology transfer from Western countries.

However, the purport of Peking's anti-Sovietism is not confined to this.

Anti-Sovietism is also an expression of the extreme nationalism of the Peking leaders, of their desire for ever to be walled off from the rich experience of the socialist countries, which would undoubtedly have been useful to China.

The Chinese leaders have to explain, first of all to their own people, why they have broken with Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. To justify their acts they heap accusations, sometimes fantastic ones, on the Soviet Union. It is claimed, for example, that "capitalism has been resorted" in the USSR, that a "fascist dictatorship" rules there, that the Soviet people are dragging out a half-starved existence, that the USSR is getting ready to con-

quer the whole world and enslave China. It is clear that in China today, where the people are denied access to outside information, such slander helps the rulers somewhat to justify the country's low living standards, the absence of political stability, the internal strife and disruption.

Anti-Sovietism, finally, is an expression of the Chinese leadership's insidious tactics aimed at disuniting the socialist countries. In concentrating their attacks on the Soviet Union, on its domestic and foreign policy, Peking's anti-Soviet propaganda-makers are trying to say that they fight the USSR only, that there are no fundamental differences between them and the other socialist states. This is a futile attempt. The socialist countries pursue a joint and coordinated foreign policy. To attack the foreign-policy acts of any one socialist country is to attack the other members of the socialist community as well. "The socialist countries and their Communist parties, including the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party," the Hungarian journal *Társadalmi Szemle* noted recently, "have long perceived Peking's tactics, which is to inflict the main blow on the Soviet Union and thus create the impression that the Chinese leadership disagrees only with the Soviet Union and its Communist Party, and in this way to try to split the socialist community."

There are no grounds to say that the Soviet Union threatens world peace or the United States or China or Europe; to say so is simply absurd.

"We do not threaten anybody," Leonid Brezhnev said in Vladivostok on April 7, 1978. "The so-called 'Soviet threat' is clearly a fabrication of the opponents of a relaxation of international tension."

The USSR's attitude towards China is devoid of aggressive intentions. The Soviet leaders have made this clear on many occasions. Addressing the Octo-

ber (1976) Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev said that "the desire to improve relations with China is our consistent policy."

The Soviet Union is ready to normalise relations with China on the principles of peaceful coexistence and socialist internationalism. This clear-cut and principled stand, which is backed by a whole series of Soviet initiatives to improve Soviet-Chinese relations, refutes the assertion that the USSR is an "aggressor" and a "warmonger".

The Soviet Union, for example, has called for the conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of force (1971) and a non-aggression pact (1973) with China, for the holding of a Soviet-Chinese summit meeting, for the restoration of economic, cultural, scientific and technical cooperation and cooperation in the field of public health, and for contacts between public organisations.

On February 24, 1978, on the eve of the session of the National People's Congress, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet addressed to the Congress's Standing Committee a proposal that the two countries issue a joint statement to the effect that they would base their relations on peaceful coexistence and that they would strictly abide by the principles of equality, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and non-use of force.

It was the Chinese side that rejected all these proposals, while at the same time trying to present the Soviet Union as a potential aggressor.

Equally absurd are the accusations that the USSR is preparing to attack Western Europe. To make such accusations means to ignore the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was initiated by the Soviet Union and other

socialist countries, to ignore also the numerous Soviet proposals aimed at deepening detente.

All the allegations of Peking propaganda about a "Soviet threat" to the West and to China itself are nothing but a provocation the purpose of which is to poison the international atmosphere and cause a head-on military clash between countries with different social systems. They are also intended to divert world opinion from Peking's own insidious plans.

In declaring the USSR to be "Enemy Number One" and in inviting the United States to join the "broadest international front" with an anti-Soviet tendency announced at the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China (August 1977), Peking has no intention whatsoever of giving the United States a gift of indulgence. The United States will remain "Enemy Number Two", which must... wait for its turn.

According to foreign newspapers, the head of the International Relations Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Keng Piao, speaking at a graduation ceremony at the Diplomatic Academy in Peking in August 1976, declared: "At the present time let the USA protect us from the Soviet Union's revisionism... When we find that the time has come, we shall say to Uncle Sam: 'Please pack your bag and go.'" And it is hardly accidental that the 1977 edition of the fifth volume of Mao's works includes the following statements of the "helmsman": "the chief danger of a new world war and the main threat of aggression against China come from bellicose elements in the United States"; and the fight against the United States "must be continued and conducted by means of force, so as to seize from it one position after another. This takes time."

So those who are arming Peking today and encouraging it to wage a war against the Soviet Union must not forget about its treacherous tactics.

Vain Attempts

Today the principles of peaceful coexistence are becoming more and more firmly established in international relations. The tendency towards a relaxation of international tension has fully manifested itself and has begun to exert a perceptible influence on world developments. This was preceded by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Belgrade meeting of its participants, which reviewed the results of the implementation of the Final Act signed in Helsinki.

Analysing this positive process taking place on our planet, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, noted: "This is a result of the changed correlation of forces in the world—above all, of the growth of the strength and international authority of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community. It is also a result of the successes of the international working-class movement and the forces of national liberation. And finally, it is a result of the acceptance of the new realities by a certain section of the ruling circles in the capitalist world."

At the same time there has been increased activity on the part of the imperialist and reactionary forces that are seeking to bring independent states and peoples under their influence, whipping up the arms race and flagrantly interfering in the internal affairs of other states, thus creating a threat to peace. Peking stands on the side of these forces.

Since the end of 1973 the Maoist leadership, contradicting its own recent allegation about an impending "surprise attack on China" by the Soviet Union, has been telling the West that "the Soviet military strategy is directed mainly against Western Europe", and that it would be a mistake to think that the Soviet Union would attack China first. This change in tactics showed that developments in Europe did not proceed along a direction the Maoists would like to see. In these conditions the Maoists were ready to alter somewhat the myth about "the threat from the North", which they had themselves invented and which they had tried so hard to force on the whole world—not without the help of extreme reactionary circles in the West, one might add. Back in August 1973, at the 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China, Chou En-lai, evidently appealing to the West, declared that the USSR was making "a feint to the East while attacking in the West."¹

Needless to say, this did not mean that Peking had given up its favourite thesis about "the threat from the North". It was preserved, but now mainly for "domestic consumption", for the purpose of frightening the Chinese people into thinking that it was "necessary" to speed up the militarisation of China and thus justify the country's low living standards.

Peking had not been able to prevent the successful completion of the Helsinki Conference. But even after it Peking continued to raise apprehensions in the Western European countries by asserting, as *Jenminjhpao* put it, that the Soviet Union "is trying, with the help of so-called 'security and cooperation', to demoralise Western European defences,

¹ The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, p. 26.

undermine the unity of Western Europe, oust the United States from there, and cover up its own aggression and expansion in Europe".

Peking expounds these theses to all visitors from capitalist countries, especially from Western Europe, and tries to make them believe that "war is inevitable", and that Western Europe will be the first victim of the "Soviet attack". Such doctrines are repeated day after day. This has been the case both under Mao and after his death.

A spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who preferred not to give his name, told a France-Presse correspondent in late October 1976 that Europe should "activate" the process of creating a European alliance. "You don't have a sufficiently developed alliance," he said. "You are too scattered and not strong enough to withstand the Soviet Union. We want Europe to be powerful; we want it to have a stronger defence system against the Soviet Union." He added that China still believed the Soviet Union would first "occupy" Europe and only then attack China.

In an interview with the editor of a Swedish pro-Maoist newspaper in August 1977 Deputy Premier Li Hsien-nien developed basically the same theses and called on Europe to unite. He also expounded Peking's attitude towards detente, saying that "detente" was "the opium of the peoples. It paralyses them so that they can be caught unawares. That is why we are not at all interested in the Belgrade meeting".

A little earlier, in June of the same year, the Chairman of the Chinese People's Society for Friendship with Foreign Countries, Wang Ping-nan, a well-known diplomat, who organised the first contacts with the United States in Warsaw in the 1950s, that is, worked in keeping with the principles of

peaceful coexistence, told a correspondent of the Peruvian newspaper *La Prensa* that "war is inevitable", "it will be the inevitable result of objective development of the present situation, which is characterised by bitterness between the two superpowers in their struggle for world domination. It no longer depends on the will of man".

Wang Ping-nan contended that a war would break out in Europe as a result of the "rivalry of the superpowers", which allegedly believed that "to achieve world domination it is necessary to conquer Europe".

Not only does Peking "predict" a world war, but tries to do everything to make the "prediction" come true. Towards this end it indulges in all manner of provocation, which sometimes takes the form of "good advice".

At a reception in honour of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, a former US Chief of Naval Operations, in July 1977, Chinese officials reiterated their long-held thesis that the USSR is "focussing attention on Western Europe". They "criticised" the United States for conducting a "policy of appeasement" towards the Soviet Union and advised it to be "firmer" in regard to the USSR. They even proposed that China and the United States should pool their efforts in coping with the "white bear".

One is sometimes struck by the cynical way the Chinese leaders manipulate their own ideas and principles, making tactical changes whenever necessary in an attempt to attain their main goal. On the one hand, Peking is noisily asserting that both "superpowers" are the "enemies" of China (and, incidentally, of all other states). On the other hand, it goes out of its way to try to bring these "superpowers" into a fatal confrontation, after which, it believes, China would become the lord of the world.

A really simple and bold plan. Peking is doing its utmost to realise it.

In late August 1977 Li Hsien-nien received the well-known US journalist Harrison Salisbury and tried to bring this message home to him: "We don't mean that the Soviet Union won't attack us. We must be ready for that. But if you compare Europe and China from the point of view of the interest which these regions present to the Soviet Union, I think you will agree that the Soviet Union is more interested in Europe."

In the second half of 1977 the thesis about the "inevitability of war", on which not the slightest doubt was cast, was supplemented with "war can be postponed". It was implied that the requisite for the postponement was the establishment of an international anti-Soviet front. This proposition was originally formulated at the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China and then explained in detail to visitors from the West.

In a conversation with a delegation of businessmen from Hawaii on September 9, 1977, Liao Cheng-chih, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, said that "war is inevitable" and explained: "So all we can do is to try in every way to postpone a new war, or to do everything in our power so that they (the Soviet Union) might not be able to start a war."

Teng Hsiao-ping, Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Deputy Premier of the State Council of the Chinese People's Republic, who returned to his former party and government posts after falling into disgrace for a second time since the days of the "cultural revolution", outlined in an interview on October 21, 1977, with Claude Roussel, President and General Director of France-Presse, a three-point strategy that

would make it possible to "postpone" a world war.

The Chinese leader's proposition to the Western states amounts to this: I am offering you a postponement of a world war, and you, in return, are to give us technical, including military, aid (Point One), take an active part in the international anti-Soviet front, whose programme we shall dictate (Point Two), and agree to an economic blockade of the Soviet Union (Point Three); now if you agree to this, act on it. Again, nothing could be more simple!

The provocative calls and predictions of the Peking leaders are rejected by all sober-minded people in Europe and other continents. That is why Peking has been increasingly turning to members of those circles whose positions have something in common with its own. The Chinese leaders are feverishly seeking contacts with supporters of a "hard line" towards the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as well as with out-and-out revanchists who demand a review of the results of the Second World War, including a revision of the postwar frontiers in Europe. Such was Peking's stance under Mao; and such is Peking's stance today.

Over the last few years the former British Conservative leader, Edward Heath, has visited Peking three times; his successor, Margaret Thatcher, has also been there. Peking has twice entertained US Senator Henry Jackson, a dedicated champion of the cold war. The Chairman of the Bavarian Christian Social Union, Franz Josef Strauss, made two trips to Peking. Among other visitors of the like were Hans Filbinger, one of the leaders of the Christian Democratic Union and Prime Minister of Länder Baden Württemberg, and Manfred Woerner (CDU), Chairman of the Bundestag Commission on Defence.

In early 1978 China played host to a delegation of the Committee on the Present Danger, a reactionary US organisation specialising in the concoction of hostile fabrications about the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The delegation immediately found a common language with their hosts, for both sides had for many years been preaching one and the same sermon, namely that the USSR is seeking "to establish its domination in Western Europe". One of the members of the delegation, Paul Nitze, a former Secretary of the Navy, on returning home announced with delight the striking identity of views.

This is the kind of people the Peking leaders feel at home with. "We are glad," said Li Hsien-nien on April 9, 1977, in a conversation with Margaret Thatcher, "that on a number of international issues we have much in common." He explained what he meant by the phrase "much in common": "In today's world the fight between the two superpowers is becoming more and more fierce. Under such circumstances there can be no question of a relaxation of tension."

As a matter of fact, the Chinese leaders want to create a tense situation in all parts of the world, and not only in Europe.

Provocation in All Directions

Peking's tentacles reach far beyond Europe; they are found wherever more or less favourable conditions for subversive and provocative activities arise.

In the Middle East there has been a conflict situation for years and Peking has been doing all it can to preserve it. Peking has not supported a single resolution the UN Security Council and the General Assembly have adopted during the last ten

years to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict. While condemning Israel and vowing loyalty to the Arab peoples, the Chinese leadership is actually concerned with something else—the conversion of the Middle East into a constantly smouldering zone.

At the 32nd session of the UN General Assembly, for example, the Chinese representatives abstained when resolutions concerning the Middle East were put to a vote, saying that they could not support the idea of convening a Geneva Peace Conference.

China's stand was regarded at the session as undisguised support for the aggressive course of Israel and its patrons. The Middle East resolutions were approved by 102 states. Only the United States and Israel voted against them. China also refused to support the General Assembly's call to guarantee the right of the Arab people of Palestine to self-determination; it was again joined by the United States and Israel.

It is quite natural that the Chinese leadership should welcome Egyptian President Sadat's collusion with Israel, for Peking saw in this act a new element which could complicate the Middle East situation. On the other hand, considering the deep split brought about in the Arab world by the treacherous actions of the Egyptian President, the Chinese leadership has been compelled to manoeuvre to conceal its real position. This is why, for example, when Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua spoke during the general debate at the 33rd session of the UN General Assembly on September 28, 1978, he did not dare, in the presence of the Arab delegations, confirm Peking's approval of the Camp David agreements, but confined himself to vague phrases about "support" for the Arabs.

Peking's stand on the Middle East question, as on other acute international problems, shows that it is acting together with imperialism and the extreme right in an attempt to counter the striving of the peoples for peace, freedom, independence and progress.

On the question of Angola, the Chinese leadership stood on the side of the imperialists and their mercenaries and of the South African racists. Together with the Western powers Peking rushed to the help of the Zaire rulers when a popular uprising broke out in the Shaba province. It sent arms and military advisers to Kinshasa. It sided with the counter-revolution in Ethiopia and sent advisers to separatist groupings in Eritrea.

Playing into the hands of the imperialist forces, the Chinese leadership seeks to split the nonalignment movement, blunt its anti-imperialist edge, and discredit such members as Cuba and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Peking launched a broad campaign aimed at depriving Cuba of the right to be a member of the nonalignment movement, and is trying to prevent the holding of the nonaligned conference in Havana in 1979.

In the Far East, the Chinese leadership is trying to force upon Japan a provocative anti-Soviet policy line. To this end it is doing all it can to put Japanese representatives in an anti-Soviet frame of mind. Chinese propaganda and officials are conducting an indoctrination campaign aimed at the Japanese, warning them against adopting an "appeasement" approach to the USSR and calling on them to wage an "even more vigorous" struggle against the "dark designs" of the USSR. The Peking leaders assert that the USSR uses economic cooperation as a "bait" to "trap Japan and make it fatten the white bear", as a result of which the pressure on Japan would

only grow and there will be no question of returning the "northern territories" to Japan.¹ Encouragement of territorial claims upon the Soviet Union and persistent harping on the subject of the "northern territories" are among the principal methods in the Chinese arsenal of influencing the Japanese.

After prolonged talks during which crude pressure was used, the Chinese leadership succeeded in imposing on Japan the so-called "Peace and Friendship Treaty". This treaty, which includes an infamous article about opposing "hegemony", to which Peking attaches an anti-Soviet meaning, is virtually directed against the peace and security of all countries of the Far East. It is evident from many facts, including the visit of Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-ping to Japan in late October 1978, that Peking is using the treaty to promote the formation of a Washington-Tokyo-Peking axis. Teng Hsiao-ping called on the Japanese, among other things, to retain the Japanese-US treaty on "security" and to step up the armament of Japan.

There has been no easing of tension at the southern borders of China caused by the expansionist activities of Peking. The Peking leadership does not cease to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries of South and Southeast Asia. It supports anti-government forces in Malaysia, Thailand and Burma, and continues to train and send into India armed gangs consisting of separatist elements from the Naga and Mizo tribes that inhabit northeastern India. Chinese emigrants are used on a large scale in Peking's attempts to interfere in the domestic affairs of China's southern neighbours. Teng Hsiao-ping's visit to Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore in

¹ *Jenminjhpao*, October 8 and 13, 1977.

November 1978 once again showed that the attitude to Peking in Southeast Asia is one of great caution.

Of late the Chinese leadership has been putting particularly crude pressure on heroic Vietnam. It is resorting to every possible method in order to force Vietnam to serve its interests. Peking prodded Kampuchea to carry out military provocations on the frontiers with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. It brought about the departure from Vietnam of a large number of ethnic Chinese so as to destabilise the situation there. All Chinese aid rendered to Vietnam under agreements signed earlier was cut off, and all Chinese specialists were recalled. The Chinese chauvinists did not stop at concentrating large numbers of troops along the border with Vietnam and committing acts of provocation. On February 17, 1979, the Chinese armed forces invaded the territory of socialist Vietnam. The Soviet government's statement of February 19, 1979, emphasized that "China's attack on Vietnam has once again confirmed Peking's irresponsible attitude towards peace, and its criminal readiness to use weapons."

Displaying great insolence Peking stops at nothing in an attempt to influence world developments.

Take, for example, China's voting records at the United Nations. What positive contribution has China made to the work of the world organisation? What has it done to promote world peace and security?

At the 26th session of the General Assembly the Chinese delegation denounced the resolution on convening a World Disarmament Conference; at the 27th session it came out against the initiative concerning the non-use of force in international relations and a permanent ban on the use of nuclear weapons; at the 28th session—against the proposal on the reduction of the military budgets of the

Security Council permanent members by 10 per cent and utilisation of the part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries; at the 29th session—against the adoption of a definition of the term "aggression"; at the 30th session it voted against the draft treaty on the complete and universal banning of nuclear weapon tests, and against the proposal concerning the prohibition of environmental and climatic influence for military and other hostile purposes; at the 31st session it opposed the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. And one can go on with the list.

China's harmful role was particularly noticeable during debates on questions of curbing the arms race and of disarmament. The Chinese representatives did not support a single one of the more than 20 resolutions on disarmament which were approved by the First Committee at the 32nd session of the UN General Assembly by an overwhelming majority of votes. Among the resolutions are important documents designed to strengthen detente and prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war.

In the voting on a number of other problems of disarmament, such as general and complete disarmament, the prohibition of chemical (biological) weapons, the prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, the Chinese delegation, fearing further isolation, resorted to its usual method—it abstained.

A particularly harmful role was played by the Chinese representatives at the special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament (May-July 1978). Repeating their hackneyed anti-Soviet formulas, they tried to turn the item on the agenda into a question of disarmament of the "superpowers",

in fact of the unilateral disarmament of the Soviet Union. Resorting to rhetoric about the interests of the nonaligned countries, the Peking representatives sought to bring about a situation in which China could accelerate the build-up of its missile-nuclear potential and thus create a material base for its expansionist plans.

There are thousands of facts testifying to Peking's lack of interest in world peace. To create an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion, to exacerbate existing conflicts, to provoke new clashes and hamper disarmament efforts—these are the goals to which the activity of the Peking leaders is directed. Everything seems to indicate that Peking needs tension to speed up its drive for world hegemony, to realise its chauvinist plans.

CHAPTER II

CHINA PREPARES FOR WAR

Modernisation of the Army—a Top Priority

Sometimes the opinion is voiced that the Chinese leaders' talk about war preparations and about the "inevitability" of war is nothing but propaganda aimed at rallying the Chinese people in an effort to solve a number of domestic problems. If only this were so...

Not only is China living under the slogan of preparation for war, but the whole activity of this vast country is designed to attain one principal goal—militarisation. In carrying out their "four modernisations" program the new Chinese leadership puts main emphasis on modernisation of the army, and this is done for the purpose of preparing for war. Moreover, the modernisation of the army is regarded, not as another short-term campaign, but as a long-term drive resting on a solid economic and technological foundation. In an article published on May 1, 1977, Hua Kuo-feng says: "We must speed up the revolutionising and modernisation of the People's Liberation Army, step up the preparation for war..."¹

Yeh Chien-ying, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the

¹ *Jenminjhpao*, May 1, 1977.

Communist Party of China, who is the third man in the Chinese hierarchy, said in May 1977 at the National Conference on Learning from Taching in Industry: "We must take steel as the key link and speed up the development of the basic industries so as to put our defence industries on a strong basis and enable them to make greater progress."¹

At the same conference Yu Chiu-li, Vice-Premier and Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the Chinese People's Republic, said: "Only with the rapid development of industry can we even more effectively carry out our strategic course: 'Be prepared against war, be prepared against natural disasters, and do everything for the people', further strengthen our defence capacity and prepare thoroughly to repulse a war of aggression."²

On January 18, 1978, *Jenminjihpao* published an editorial on the results of the national conference on metallurgy. It noted the importance of achieving a high rate of development of the iron-and-steel industry "in the light of the present international situation, in the conditions of the struggle for world hegemony between the USSR and the United States, between which a war will flare up sooner or later". The editorial boasted that the Chinese metallurgical industry had already accomplished the task of "providing the materials necessary for the production of atomic and hydrogen bombs and artificial satellites".³

In a word, while Chinese politicians and diplomats are provoking conflicts everywhere and instigating the Western states to wage a war against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, China it-

self is forging arms and waiting for a suitable moment. And the Chinese are being constantly told that high development rates are of paramount importance for preparing the country for war. "The question of the speed of construction," Hua Kuo-feng explained at the National Conference on Learning from Taching in Industry, "is a political rather than a purely economic question. When viewed in the light of the international class struggle, the political nature of this question stands out still more sharply... We must definitely be ready for war."¹

When it comes to conducting work among servicemen, the aims of such work are spelled out in no uncertain terms: "'The army must be streamlined, it must be ready to fight'-this is the main thesis that must be adhered to in conducting work among the troops," *Jenminjihpao* wrote in December 1977.

Every aspect of life in China today is subordinated to the aim of the militarists: to raise the combat efficiency of the army. And the Chinese leadership is constantly saying that the process of modernisation and re-equipment of the army must be accelerated. In August 1977, on the 50th anniversary of the army, three leading publications, in keeping with an accepted custom practised on important occasions, put out a joint article under the title "To Accelerate the Modernisation of the Army". The article points out that "the factor of war is growing", that "a desperate fight is raging between the two hegemonsthe Soviet Union and the United States", and that "the Soviet revisionists have never for a moment given up the idea of enslaving our country". From this the conclusion is drawn that "it is necessary to step up the building of the army and accelerate the rate of modernisation of defence". The impor-

¹ *Peking Review*, No. 21, May 20, 1977, p. 18.

² *Hungchi*, No. 6, 1977, p. 27.

³ *Jenminjihpao*, January 18, 1978.

¹ *Peking Review*, No. 21, May 20, 1977, p. 13.

tance of these tasks is confirmed by the respective "thoughts" of Mao. It is emphasised that his injunctions—"The land, air and naval forces must become mighty; we must have a certain number of atomic and hydrogen bombs, etc."—are an "enormous contribution to the treasure-house of Marxist-Leninist military teachings".¹

Speaking on September 30, 1977, at a reception held in Peking to mark the national holiday of the People's Republic of China, Hua Kuo-feng defined the tasks of the Chinese army and its role in Chinese society as follows: "The officers and men of the People's Liberation Army are intensifying the revolutionising and modernisation of the army and the preparation for war, thanks to which the army has begun to play an even greater role as the bulwark of the dictatorship of the proletariat."²

As *Jenminjihpao* reported on April 10, 1978, the Military Council of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a "Resolution on Improving Organisation and Strengthening Discipline in the Army". That measure was regarded as part of the policy to "streamline the army and prepare for war".

On May 14, 1978, *Jenminjihpao* published the Military Council's resolution on expanding the educational programme for troops. It obliges troops to raise their fighting efficiency and be ready at any moment to carry out any combat tasks.

In the field of military-economic preparations priority is given to the accelerated development of an up-to-date war industry, with particular emphasis on those branches which are connected with the realisation of nuclear, missile and space programmes.

¹ *Jenminjihpao*, August 1, 1977.

² *Jenminjihpao*, October 1, 1977.

China began carrying out its atomic programme in 1953. In subsequent years the development of nuclear weapons production proceeded at an intensive rate. According to foreign press reports, already in the early 1970s the Chinese People's Republic put into operation two plants (in the cities of Lanchow and Yumen) producing nuclear fuel. The one in Lanchow has been producing uranium-235 by the gas diffusion method since the spring of 1962. It is believed that by the mid-1970s its capacity was 270 kilograms of uranium-235 a year, and that stockpiles of this substance have reached approximately 1,800 kilograms, which is enough to produce 100 20-kiloton atomic bombs. There have been reports that a second gas-diffusion installation similar in size and capacity to the one in Lanchow has been commissioned.

The main plant for the production of plutonium-239 is located in Yumen. According to estimates by foreign specialists, the Yumen reactor can produce more than 200 kilograms of plutonium-239 a year, which is enough to make 40 nuclear bombs a year. A small quantity of plutonium is also produced in the town of Paotow. It is assumed that the amount of plutonium-239 produced in the country since 1967, the first year of such production, is enough for the making of 180 medium bombs.

These figures relate to the early 1970s. The figures now are undoubtedly much higher, in view of Peking's recent directives to accelerate the "modernisation of defence".

Despite worldwide protests, by the end of March 1978 China had carried out 24 nuclear weapon tests, including six that were conducted after the death of Mao Tse-tung.

Parallel with the development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, Peking has been paying a good

deal of attention to the creation of the means of delivery. Prior to 1976 China's nuclear weapons production programme, according to the US press, put emphasis on the creation of ballistic missiles of medium range (600-700 miles) and intermediate range (1,500-1,700) miles. The *Washington Post* (September 1, 1978), referring to a report prepared by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said that China "may finally have deployed multistage intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range of 3,000 to 3,500 miles". Missiles of this type were first tested by China in 1976. At present, according to press reports, the Chinese People's Republic is developing a new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range of 8,000 miles.

According to US estimates, China has several hundred nuclear bombs which can be delivered by some 80 medium TU-16 bombers having a flight range of 2,000 miles, or by fighter-bombers, or by rockets.

China's progress in the field of nuclear research may be far greater than is believed among Western circles. This is suggested, for example, by comments, reported in the *Japan Times* on December 31, 1977, made by a professor of nuclear physics of the University of Tokyo, Tadashi Sekiguti, and four other Japanese specialists who visited Peking at the invitation of the Academy of Sciences of China. They said that before their visit they believed China was more than ten years behind other countries in the field of nuclear synthesis, but that after familiarising themselves with the situation in China it became clear to them that the lag was no more than 5 or 6 years.

China, as said earlier, flatly rejects all measures for limiting armaments. At a time when the whole world protests against plans to produce the neutron

bomb, Peking says "the neutron bomb is not such a bad weapon after all", and attacks the Soviet proposal on mutual renunciation of the production of this weapon. Peking in fact does not conceal that it would like to develop such a weapon itself. One of the deputy chiefs of the Chinese Army General Staff, Chang Ai-ping, became so enthusiastic about the neutron bomb that he composed a poem, published in one of the national Chinese newspapers, in which he announced China's intention to possess this weapon.

China already has an enormous army. According to data given in the foreign press for 1977, its armed forces number four million men, and over the last two years the figure has increased by one million. The land forces alone have grown by 500,000 men. The Navy has 300,000 men, and the Air Force 400,000.

As pointed out in a report of the UN Disarmament Commission, the military expenditure of the Chinese People's Republic accounts for more than 40 per cent of the country's budget. According to Western estimates, China spends about 10 per cent of its gross national product on military needs.

The Peking militarists do not seem to be much concerned about the heavy economic burden that militarisation imposes on the Chinese people. At all costs they want to attain their great-power goal: to turn China into the world's leading military and political power. Because of Mao Tse-tung's experiments China lags far behind the developed countries of the world. Therefore, the whipping up of war hysteria and the building up of the country's military and nuclear missile potential will mean continued low living standards for the Chinese people.

A strict rationing system for basic foodstuffs and manufactured goods still exists in China, and wages

remain low. It was announced that from October 1, 1977, workers in industry and the service sphere who "have a long work record and comparatively low wages" would receive higher pay. But the size of the increment was not given either in absolute figures or in percentage. This means that the increase was insignificant and was intended mainly to boost the morale of the people and rally them for carrying out the tasks of the "four modernisations", and to enhance public confidence in the new leadership. The economy was in such a plight in recent years that no substantial wage increase would have been possible.

According to estimates, overall industrial output in 1976 decreased in comparison with 1975. Steel production dropped from 26 to 21 million tons: the output of coal and other industrial products also decreased. In April 1977 it was noted at the National Conference on Learning from Taching in Industry that "many plants were idle for long spells last year".

The situation in agriculture was no better. In 1976 its produce was about 5 per cent less than that of the previous year; the grain crop (including potatoes counted as grain at 4:1 ratio) amounted to a mere 225 million tons (as against 235 million in 1975), and cotton fibre, 1.8 million tons (as against 1.9 million tons in 1975). The poor harvest and the threat of a drought compelled Peking to increase its food imports. Contracts were concluded for the purchase of 12 million tons of grain from the United States, Australia, Canada and other countries; 8 of the 12 million were delivered in late 1977.

The harvest of 1977 was even worse than that of 1976¹. All this goes to show that the Chinese leader-

ship was forced to announce the wage increase in the face of growing mass discontent and deep apathy among wage and salary earners.

While the decline in production in 1976 was explained to the people by the "subversive activity" of the "gang of four", the poor harvest of 1977 could no longer be blamed on the "gang" since it was removed from the political scene in October 1976.

As the Chinese press admits, per capita grain production in the Chinese People's Republic in 1977 was below the 1955 level. Because of the bad harvest of 1978 the situation has not improved much.

In industry a slight improvement may be noted. According to official figures, steel production rose to 30 million tons in 1978. But the overall situation remains grave. US journalists who visited a number of industrial enterprises in Harbin in December 1978 and interviewed the management had pointed out, as reported in the *Washington Post*, that work stoppage due to lack of materials was typical, that labour discipline was poor and the morale of the workers remained low.

But small though it was, the wage rise worsened the disproportion in the Chinese economy and forced the leaders to take additional economy measures. In an article published in *Jenminjihpao* on November 15, 1977, (i.e. one and a half months after the announcement on the wage rise) an "observer" said that the rise could aggravate the problem of supply of foodstuffs and other goods. "The production of consumer goods," the paper pointed out, "has not reached the planned level yet," and the output of such products as pork, poultry and eggs "has not yet increased sufficiently to meet demand." "The growth of the people's buying power resulting from the increase in wages and salaries can create certain

¹ *Die Welt*, January 12, 1978.

difficulties in the supply of goods to the market," *Jenminjihpao* frankly admitted.

The Chinese press has been publishing more and more articles calling for economy. "Overindulgence in food and drink is a shame," *Jenminjihpao* said on November 7, 1977. "Staunchness and selflessness are honourable."

To say that the Chinese toiler is "overindulgent" is, to put it mildly, unwarranted. He has never been overindulgent; he has known only shortages. So when he is told "to stop being overindulgent", he is really being asked to pull his belt even tighter—which cannot be done.

In late January, 1978, the French newspaper *L'Express* carried an article by Claudie and Jacques Broyelle, who worked for about two years for a Peking periodical as foreign editors. They cite the following facts: a resident of Peking can buy on his coupon 8 ounces of vegetable oil a month; a resident of Shenyang, a major industrial city in Manchuria, gets only 16 ounces of vegetable oil a year and 50 grams of sugar a month for himself and his family!

The chances that this situation may improve are slim. It was pointed out in the communique of the 3rd plenary meeting of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in December 1978 that "at the present stage it is not possible yet to develop our national economy at a high rate".

Understandably, in these conditions the continuation of the course of militarisation will only help to preserve the low living and cultural standards of the working people. But then this seems to be exactly what the successors to Mao Tse-tung need in order to be able to manipulate the masses more easily. "If one is poor," Mao said in January 1958, "one is capable of rising up in a revolution, and an illit-

erate person easily accepts new ideas." As to what kind of "ideas" are being drummed into the Chinese working people and what kind of "revolution" they are being driven to by their leaders, the answer is well known and can be expressed in one word—war.

Arms for Anti-Sovietism

In their military plans the Peking leaders reserve a special place for the Western countries from which they want to obtain up-to-date military technology. Accordingly, they had to rectify the thesis about "reliance on one's own forces". At the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China a new slogan was formulated: "Place the old at the service of the new, place the foreign at the service of China." This shows Peking's desire to make wider use of the scientific, technological and economic potential of the capitalist world in carrying out its plans to rearm China and modernise its armed forces.

At a reception given in honour of French Premier Raymond Barre on January 19, 1978, Teng Hsiao-ping reaffirmed this course by saying that China would carry out the "four modernisations" by "relying on its own forces and also by adopting the advanced experience of foreign countries in the field of science and technology".

This policy line has met with a positive response among reactionary circles in the West. Ultra-right opponents of detente, who are associated with the arms-producing monopolies, are ready to give Peking weapons and military equipment in exchange for its anti-Sovietism and hostility towards the socialist countries. The London *Observer* (November 13, 1977) was fairly cynical about the matter: "Only if they /the Peking leaders/ act as a counter-balance to the

Russians, treating the Soviet Union as a far worse enemy than the US, can they inspire the minimum of self-interested trust of the West that will enable them to acquire the maximum of the 'sensitive' technology they need."

In the last few years China has purchased Western equipment that is of direct or indirect military significance. In December 1975 it concluded a 20-million-dollar deal with the British Rolls-Royce company for the purchase of Spey aircraft engines and the license to manufacture engines of this type. From the FRG and France it bought helicopters. And the United States sold China two electronic machines suitable for military use.

According to a report released by the Japanese Kyodo Tsushin agency on January 31, 1978, China has been conducting negotiations for the import from the Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm firm of thirty BO-105 helicopters, each armed with six anti-tank missiles.

The position taken by the United States on this question is that it will not prevent other countries from selling arms to China, although for the time being it will not do so itself. This has been confirmed by US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at a press conference on November 3, 1978. At the same time the United States sells China equipment and materials belonging to the so-called "grey zone", which is related to both civilian and military industries.

The US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) reported on January 7, 1979, that it was agreed in principle that China would purchase from the United States an American satellite communications system, including ground receiving and distributing equipment, and that the United States would put some of the satellites in the system into orbit. The United States also agreed to sell China a

gigantic atomic accelerator for experiments in high energy physics. Talks are under way, besides, concerning China's buying from France of two atomic power plants working on American reactors. The United States has already agreed to sell them to China.

As the US and Japanese press reported, during his visit to China in May 1978 Zbigniew Brzezinski informed the Chinese side of the Carter administration's decision not to prevent the sale of West European "defence" weapons to China. And his account of the neutron bomb was heard "with great interest".

According to what French Defence Minister Ivon Bourges said in an interview granted to France Presse on October 25, 1978, the French government had been negotiating with the Chinese People's Republic about the sale of "defence weapons" to the latter. It was mentioned by *The New York Times* the day before that the negotiations between France and China concerned a deal for the delivery to China of 15,000 anti-tank projectiles and anti-aircraft missiles of the Milan, Hot and Crotale types, and of a certain number of helicopters, and for the sale of a license for making missiles. The deal will cost China 350 million dollars.

China is negotiating with Britain for the purchase of vertical take-off Harrier aircraft. At the beginning of 1979 the British government confirmed that it intended to sell these planes on condition that China would also buy other goods from it. According to *The Daily Telegraph* of February 8, 1979, China asked Vickers to design a new type of tank according to technical characteristics to be supplied by the Chinese. China would order 400 to 600 such tanks after preliminary testing. In addition, it intended to ask for British assistance in building its own works

for the manufacture of the new tanks. Britain also intends to sell China diesel engines for warships.

According to a report by Kyodo Tsushin agency, during a visit paid to China in September 1978 by a delegation of the Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies, the Chinese side explored the possibility of joint development of jet plane engines. Next April China intends to send to Japan a special group to discuss this matter.

All these facts point to China's intention to develop military cooperation with the Western states and Japan.

Another indication of such intentions is the increasing exchange of military delegations. In September 1976, shortly before Mao's death, China was visited by James Schlesinger, who had received Peking's invitation when he was US Secretary of Defense. Not long before that Guy Méry, the Chief of the General Staff of the French Army, was on a visit there. The visit of Marshal Neil Cameron, Chief of the General Staff of the British Army, took place in May 1978. In September 1977 the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army of China, Yang Cheng-wu, paid a visit to France. In June 1978 another Deputy Chief of the Chinese General Staff, Chang Ai-ping, visited Sweden, France, Switzerland and Italy. In September of the same year yet another Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Chang Nai-chien, visited Japan. These were, so to speak, official visits. In addition unofficial and secret visits were made to China by "shadow ministers" and former military men.

In September 1977 a visit to Peking was paid by the former Inspector of the Bundeswehr Air Force and former Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO, now retired, General Johannes Steinhoff. The same month Peking received another group of

former military men who accompanied Manfred Woerner (CDU), Chairman of the Bundestag Committee for Defense, on a visit to the Chinese capital. The group included Johann Adolf von Kielmansegg and Heinz Trettner, both retired generals, and Rear-Admiral G. Poser.

It is worth noting that von Kielmansegg was a participant in the invasion of Poland and France by Hitler's troops and in the mass shooting of civilians in these countries. Heinz Trettner bore direct responsibility for the destruction of the Spanish town of Guernica in 1937 and for war crimes committed in Czechoslovakia, Norway, Denmark, France, Italy and the Soviet Union in the Second World War. As to Johannes Steinhoff, when he was in Hitler's army, he was awarded the highest Nazi military orders and is known as one of the most zealous champions of the policy of militarism and revanchism.

Japanese military men are among the frequent visitors too. In the summer of 1977 O. Kaihara, former General Secretary of the National Defense Council, was in Peking. The Chinese side, according to a report by the Kyodo Tsushin agency, declared its full support for the positions expounded by Kaihara, including the call for the military build-up of Japan. Kaihara was present at the Chinese army exercises that were conducted at that time.

O. Kaihara was not the first representative of the Japanese military to go to China. In April 1977 a representative of the Japanese National Defense Agency, Hisao Iwashima, was in the Chinese People's Republic on a "top secret" mission, as the Kyodo Tsushin agency reported. And before him, in 1976, a group of Japanese regular army officers visited China in the guise of members of a rifle club.

Iwashima's visit was the first official visit paid to China by a Japanese military figure after the Sec-

ond World War. During his two-week stay there he watched division exercises of the People's Liberation Army of China in the Kwangchou district and had a number of meetings with high-ranking military men and other officials.

After Iwashima China was visited in the same year by a group of Japanese naval experts and by the former Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces of Japan, Hideo Miyoshi. Military delegations continued to go to China in 1978. They were all given a grand welcome and invited to attend military exercises and discuss military matters with the Chinese side.

These contacts serve a variety of purposes, but they are all connected with China's plans to modernise its armed forces.

It should be noted that among China's guests there were not only military men who held official posts, but also retired generals, including participants in the Second World War and even persons who were involved in war crimes against the European peoples.

The invitation of war criminals serves at least three purposes. First, it serves a political purpose. Peking demonstrates, as it were, to representatives of the former Axis Powers that it harbours no prejudice whatsoever against them despite their past activities, that they have its complete trust. Meanwhile Peking hopes to be rewarded by their sympathy and understanding as it carries out its plans to modernise the Chinese army. Thus homage is paid to the military caste, as one being above the historical and political changes taking place in the world.

Second, the former military officers from the FRG and Japan are of interest to the Chinese leaders as direct participants in a war fought against both the Soviet Union and the United States, today's "super-powers" whom China has declared its enemies.

Finally, in exchanging military delegations Peking has in mind the practical tasks of fitting out its army with foreign military equipment and borrowing foreign military technology.

Interestingly enough, the Chinese militarists have been rather frank about the poor technical equipment of their army. Chinese generals, French newspapers reported in September 1977, made it clear to their foreign counterparts that their army was in a deplorable state.

Coming from the Chinese, with their acute sense of national pride, such an admission can only mean that they badly need Western technology and know-how; for the sake of this they are willing to a certain extent to check their self-esteem.

In early February 1978 a trade agreement between the Chinese People's Republic and the European Economic Community, which provides for granting China "most favoured nation treatment", was initialled; it was signed in early April.

The policy of drawing close to the EEC, which Peking has been conducting for several years, pursues obvious aims: to establish contacts with NATO through the Common Market and form a bloc with it on a platform of bellicose anti-Sovietism, and to gain access to Western arms and military technology needed for modernising its army.

Although in the EEC countries there is a strict ban on the export of "strategic materials to communist countries", the head of the EEC delegation at the talks with Peking, Roy Denman, emphasised at a press conference held after the initialling of the agreement that it made no provision for any limitation on the sale of strategic commodities to China.

That China is interested in Western military equipment and technology is beyond a shadow of doubt. But it is unlikely that China will be an indiscriminate

wholesale buyer of war planes, tanks, missiles and other military hardware. Most Western observers are of the opinion that China's military purchases will be selective. There are quite a few good reasons why this should be so. First, China has limited means. Second, the principle of "reliance on one's own forces", far from being abandoned, has only been modified; this reflects a desire to avoid anything that resembles "dependence". So it is reasonable to assume that the Chinese will be mostly borrowing Western military technology and will avoid buying batches of arms as far as possible.

This reasoning is borne out by the following facts. On November 16, 1977, *Kwangming jihpao* published a comment made by Chen Chun-hsien, a researcher at the Physics Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, on the subject of utilising the achievements of foreign science and technology. He backed up his arguments in favour of such utilisation by referring to the example of Japan, which, he said, had been able, by drawing on foreign experience in building thermo-nuclear installations, to achieve a high level of research in the use of thermo-nuclear energy, having incurred only one-tenth of the expenditure involved.

The publication of this comment no doubt served to show the road that China ought to take.

Commenting on the results of Yang Cheng-wu's trip to France, the US magazine *Newsweek* said in December 1977 that "the inspection tour fell far short of the buying frenzy that the Europeans had hoped for: Peking said it wanted only a few prototypes to send home, break down and copy".¹

The Chinese have more than once told the Americans that they don't want to buy arms from them. But China persists in seeking access to US scienti-

fic and technological achievements. Hundreds and thousands of Americans working in scientific and many other fields are being invited to China. About one third of the scientists invited are Americans of Chinese origin. It is doubtless that Peking believes that any Chinese living in a foreign country is bound to China by many ties and will always help it in time of need. Of late Peking has been paying a great deal of attention to Chinese emigrants in an attempt to enlist their help in fulfilling the tasks facing China. The emigrants are being reminded that they have "blood ties" with China, and that they cannot stand aloof from the "creation of the broadest international front of struggle against the hegemony of the superpowers".¹

Among overseas Chinese there are quite a few world-famous scientists, including Nobel Prize winners. In the second half of 1977 alone China was visited by the well-known US physicists Ting Chao-chung, Teng Chian-li and Wu Chian-hsung, the mathematician Hao Wang, the biologist Niu Man-chiang and others. Such people are accorded the highest honours. They are taken to institutes and asked to deliver lectures. They make a definite contribution to solving problems in which Peking is interested.

Peking, then, is well on the way to building up its military power with the full backing of the forces of anti-communism and extreme reaction. In the face of this it would be an unforgivable mistake to be indifferent.

Militarism in Every Sphere of Life

Several years ago an underground railway was built in Peking running across the city from east to west. Later on other lines appeared. But no foreigner

¹ *Newsweek*, December 12, 1977, p. 4.

¹ *Jenminjihpao*, January 4, 1978.

in Peking is allowed to enter the underground: it is primarily a military object from which foreigners are barred.

But after all the underground is a transport artery and is mainly used as such. Why have the Chinese built thousands of kilometres of other underground tunnels in recent years beneath the cities of China? It turns out that this has been done in response to Mao Tse-tung's call "Be ready for war, dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere".

The tunnels are one of the material proofs that Peking is seriously preparing for war. They are a warning to the Chinese people that war is approaching. And Western visitors are taken on excursions to some of the catacombs and given to understand that since a war with the USSR is "inevitable", help is expected from their countries.

Descriptions of Peking underground tunnels have recently appeared in the Western press. It appears that the tunnels run on two levels—at a depth of 25 and 50 feet. According to Chinese officials, they can accommodate four million people, which is about half the size of the population in the main section of the city. Tunnels on the first level are about seven feet high and four feet wide, and are vaulted with concrete ceilings. The main tunnels, which are broad enough for traffic, are on the second, deeper level. The Chinese say that the tunnels can withstand anything except a direct nuclear hit, and that the system of air filters provides protection from radiation. But Western visitors note that the ventilation and air-pumping equipment look quite primitive.

Manfred Woerner and the retired generals and admirals accompanying him were shown the tunnels in the town of Huhehot in Inner Mongolia in October 1977. They took a ride on an eight-kilometre-long underground line which comes onto the surface

somewhere out of town. Such underground roads, in the opinion of the FRG delegation, can provide limited protection from an attack in which only conventional arms are used.

Now let us look at what the official Chinese news agency Hsinhua said about the underground tunnels on August 26, 1977:

"Many cities in China already have a network of underground anti-aircraft tunnels with systems of ventilation, water supply, drainage and electric supply. In many of such networks plants and factories, shops, hospitals, theatres, etc. are operating. In the event of air raids many thousands or even a million of people in a number of cities can within a short time take refuge in these shelters, which also serve as initial positions from which offensives can be mounted by the divisions and regiments of our People's Militia."

Underground tunnels in rural areas had been constructed in the past, namely during the anti-Japanese war (1937-1945) and during the civil war that followed it.

This experience of guerrilla warfare, extended to today's peaceful conditions, has led to an unprecedented expenditure of manpower and material resources, which might have found more useful application in a country where the standard of living is one of the lowest in the world.

On November 1, 1978, Yeh Chian-ying addressed the Third Conference on the "People's Air Defence" in Peking. He called on the people "to pay serious attention to the digging of tunnels", to assign "an important place" to this work, "to give up food and sleep to carry out this work energetically". He expressed the hope that the Chinese people would be able to build a "modern underground Great Wall". In explaining why such an expensive programme

was needed, Yeh Chian-ying referred to the thesis about the "growing factor of war" and repeated the slanderous assertion that the USSR "has not given up hopes of subduing China".

When one reads or hears about these tunnels, one is reminded of the troubles Paris once had because of the stone extraction carried on in past centuries in underground quarries situated within city limits. The cities of China are certain to be confronted by the danger of collapse in the course of future urban development. At present, however, the construction of tunnels is going on, the Chinese press reports. It is proceeding along with modernisation of the army and indoctrination of the whole population in keeping with the Maoist principle that "the entire nation are soldiers".

The main role in preparing the people for war is played by the People's Militia which is approximately 60 million strong and includes a cadre corps of 14 million people.

The cadre is made up of men and women under 35 years of age, mostly demobilised soldiers of the People's Liberation Army. It is actually the first reserve force intended to carry out joint actions with the People's Liberation Army. The rest of the People's Militia, less well trained and without a fixed structure, is intended to wage guerrilla warfare and support the army in the field.

In September 1978 measures to build up the People's Militia were carried out in the provinces as well as in the major cities under the slogan "The entire nation are soldiers". The aim of the country-wide campaign was active preparation for war, and one of the tasks set was to build up the People's Militia, particularly its core—the regular contingent of the People's Militia "capable", as Hopeh province

radio noted, "of being mobilised quickly and entering battle without additional training". According to radio broadcasts, the provinces have actively set about carrying out the instruction of a recent national conference on work with the People's Militia.

A group of foreign correspondents was invited to Singkiang in October 1978. They later told that in that region backwardness ("an archaic economy", "thriving Islam") existed side by side with modern grounds for testing nuclear weapons, and that large-scale militarisation was under way. In Singkiang there are about 200 Chinese "kibbutzim"—state farms whose members consist mostly of demobilised soldiers and officers. One of these state farms was described by a British correspondent in an article published in an October issue of the *Sunday Times*, 1978. It has approximately 40,000 members, of whom 15,000 are armed with machine guns. The head of the farm is a former political commissar of an army division, and the demobilised soldiers of the division make up the male membership. There are, of course, sites for shooting practice and for training in the laying of mines and throwing of hand grenades. In view of the modernisation of the armed forces the military at the state farm hope to receive tanks, armoured cars and pieces of artillery (1). According to the British correspondent, the farm is unprofitable, but its organisers are mainly interested in its military aspect.

True to the spirit of anti-Sovietism, the Chinese hosts explained that farms like theirs were meant to serve as a "second line of defence" (unlike the regular army) in the event of an attack by the "mighty aggressor". But this explanation does not hold water because such militarised settlements have existed since 1949, as the Chinese themselves say. The fact is that the "kibbutzim" are an embodiment of the militarist line based on ceaseless preparation for

war, and on the slogan "The entire nation are soldiers".

Even children are involved in military training. When the FRG delegation headed by Manfred Woerner visited a People's Militia firing field, it was met by adolescents headed by a ten-year boy. He was checking carbine locks. His subordinates were of the same age and were armed with carbines. The children were firing with live cartridges, and they were pretty good.

When the same delegation visited a spinning mill in Huhehot, the woman workers demonstrated their combat readiness. Within 30 seconds they could take their place at a twin anti-aircraft gun mount placed in the mill's yard, aim at a target and fire.

Venezuelan Senator and journalist, Eleazar Diaz Rangel made a trip to China in 1977 and wrote about his impressions in an article published in the magazine *Momento*. Everywhere, he says, people talk about war, from the peasant to the top official. The country is ready for a military conflict.

Wherever you go in China, you see people in green uniform. They are soldiers. The streets, parks, cinemas, exhibitions, restaurants are full of them. They patrol the streets, on foot or in cars. They stand on guard at numerous posts—at the entrance to the underground, at the central library of Peking, and they will take a seat near you in the cinema if you are a foreigner.

The green uniform is everywhere in China today. It is proof that the country is dominated by a military-bureaucratic dictatorship that emerged as a result of the "cultural revolution".

Fourty-eight per cent of the people elected to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at the 11th Party Congress (August 1977) and about two-thirds of the Political Bureau members are mi-

litary men. At the last session of the Chinese parliament—the National People's Congress, held in February-March 1978, more than 500 of the 3,500 deputies, or 15 per cent, were military men.

For many years now the Peking leaders have been working towards militarisation of every aspect of life in the country as instructed by Mao. And this is turning the Chinese into obedient executors of the will of their leaders; they are ready to rush into battle at the very first order from above. "To militarise all organisations, to give all activities a military character, to subject every aspect of life to military discipline—these three slogans," Mao emphasised, "are very good." According to him, "this is a great efficient army capable of raising production, transforming life, ensuring rest and recreation, promoting the study of culture, and building a military democracy... A situation in which the entire nation are soldiers is inspiring and encouraging".

Mao's successors, too, are always stressing the "need" to organise the life of the Chinese on the army model. In a report on constitutional amendments delivered at the first session of the National People's Congress on March 1, 1978, the Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Yeh Chian-ying, said: "For a long time now our People's Liberation Army has maintained in its companies the 'three great democracies', i.e. political, economic and military democracy, and this has yielded good results and facilitated the attainment of the 'three main goals': a high degree of political unity, improved living conditions, and a higher level of combat skill and tactical training. If we can achieve this in the army, which carries weapons in its hands, why can't we do the same in the factories and plants, in the villages, at trading enter-

prises, at all our organizations and higher educational establishments?"¹

Army methods have been widely applied in the organisation of work and daily life since Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the policy of the "three red banners" (the "general line", the "big leap" and the "people's communes") in 1958. The organisation of work along military lines in the "people's communes" was designed to turn the peasant into a person liable to military service, one who at any moment can lose his personal freedom.

In 1965 the so-called "cultural revolution" got under way in China, which was in effect a counter-revolutionary coup leading to the establishment of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship in the country. In the "cultural revolution" the army was used to put down any resistance to the course being followed. In fact the whole of the country's political, economic and ideological life was placed under the control of the army. Battalions, companies and platoons were formed of factory and office workers and students. The "revolutionary committees" at many enterprises were headed by military men.

A further militarisation of the work routine and daily life of the Chinese working people is reflected in the "experience of Taching and Tachai", models on which the entire Chinese people are urged to organise their life. What Taching and Tachai have in common is their barrack-type self-sufficient economy.

Taching is an oil field in northeast China where the workers and other employees are engaged not only in oil extraction, but also in the production of essential foodstuffs and consumer goods. The "experience of Taching" is presented by the Maoists as an example of "reliance on one's own forces", of the

"elimination of differences" between town and country.

Tachai is a big production team in one of the districts of Shansi province, "famed" for its barrack-type self-sufficient economy which practically makes do without any subsidies from the state and even undertakes to deliver to it a maximum amount of produce by means of requisitioning the whole of the surplus produce and even a part of the essential minimum needed by the peasants.

Of late the Chinese people have been exhorted "to learn from Tachai in agriculture and from Taching in industry". Two national conferences on the "dissemination of the experience of Tachai and Taching" were held in late 1976 and mid-1977. At the conference on Taching (May 1977) the Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Yeh Chian-ying, said: "What is our orientation? It is, as Chairman Mao pointed out in 1958, to organise industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, and military affairs (People's Militia, i.e. the people as a whole under arms) systematically and step by step into a big commune, which will thus form the basic unit of our society. Taching and Tachai represent this orientation pointed out by Chairman Mao."¹

In a word, the task is to turn China into a Taching- and Tachai-type barrack where hundreds of millions of citizens are to live under strict military control.

At the same conference Hua Kuo-feng, the new Chairman of the Communist Party Central Committee, formulated Taching's moral credo whereby the working man must live. It is known as the "Ten No's": "Fearing neither hardship nor death, seeking neither fame nor fortune, paying no heed to whether

¹ *Jenminjhpao*, March 8, 1978.

¹ *Peking Review*, No. 21, May 20, 1977, p. 10.

working conditions are good or bad, whether working hours are long or short, whether pay or position is high or low, and giving no thought to whether work is assigned or voluntary, whether it is work at the front or service in the rear."¹

The personal life of the Chinese is regimented and controlled. In feudal China there was established a system of collective responsibility—pao-chia—whereby the whole population was divided into groups of ten and every member of a group bore personal responsibility for the rest. The influence of that system is undoubtedly still felt in China today.

In all urban districts the inhabitants of several houses form a collective responsibility system. They must regularly inform on one another. This enables the authorities to know what people do and think, and to compile dossiers on them.

Another widespread form of control in China involves the use of diary. All pupils, factory and office workers, soldiers and officers must keep a diary. The head of every collective not only has the right but the obligation to read the diaries of his subordinates, to watch over their views and moods.

Yet another form of control is the writing of "self-analyses". Chinese students, for example, are obliged to write them regularly and describe their political views, note the "progress" they have made in "revolutionising their consciousness", criticise their erroneous thoughts and deeds ("erroneous" from the point of view of the Maoist catechism) and map out ways of rectifying their "mistakes".

All these methods of physical and ideological control turn the ordinary man in China into a person who is frightened and easily influenced, who is subjected to massive indoctrination in the chauvinist, militarist spirit.

¹ *Peking Review*, No. 21, May 20, 1977, p. 10.

For decades now the Chinese have been told to "learn from the army", to learn everything, but mainly to learn to be obedient and prepared to carry out any order. There is a whole pantheon of "exemplary" soldiers and units from whom one "should learn".

Back in 1963 Mao Tse-tung ordered the Chinese people to "learn from Lei Fen". Who was Lei Fen? He was a driver in the army, the commander of a squad in a transportation company. He was killed in 1962 in an automobile accident. After his death his diaries were published (another function of the diary!); they were full of such sentences as: "Chairman Mao is my father. The ideas of Chairman Mao are like the sun;" "I will really become a good soldier of Chairman Mao".

That is why the Chinese press is always turning to the subject of Lei Fen. On March 5, 1978, *Jenminjih-pao* carried an article which said that people should be educated in such a way that they might be like Lei Fen.

Today the Chinese people are openly being trained to kill, and to kill as many as possible. To justify in advance any future crimes that they might commit for the sake of their great-power plans, the Peking chauvinists cynically make use of the real feats of arms accomplished by Chinese patriots in defending their motherland in the past.

Thus, the "tough" 6th company, which distinguished itself in the anti-Japanese war (1937-1945), is being singled out for praise. The press gives wide coverage to the exploits of Yin Yu-feng and Liu Ssu-hu, who killed seven enemy soldiers each in one battle. The publicizing of such exploits is directly linked with the theme of "preparation for war".

The need to "learn from Lei Fen" and to follow the example of the "tough" 6th company was again em-

phased at a rally attended by foremost servicemen and advanced collectives of the Air Force of the People's Liberation Army of China,¹ held in September 1978 in Peking.

The name Lei Fen heads a long list of Maoist "heroes". Their diaries are also published in large editions. The names of the authors are different, but the ideological and political message is the same: to bring up "yes-men" who are ready to lay down their lives for the sake of Peking's great-power, hegemonic ideals.

Probably never before has the Chinese leadership brainwashed millions of people by fanning such war hysteria, whipping up fear and creating a "besieged fortress" situation. The ordinary man has no notion of the real situation in the world as a result of many years of ideological indoctrination; he is fed with the speeches of the country's top leaders and with press material and radio and TV broadcasts which tell him that he will soon have to fight in a "big", "unavoidable" war because somebody intends to "enslave" or "colonise" or "destroy" China.

Simultaneously with the whipping up of fear, a propaganda campaign is launched to provide ideological "justification" for the war preparataions in China which are doing great damage to the country's economy. Although China still does not have a clear-cut and detailed programme of socio-economic development (no mention was made of it at the 11th Congress of the Communist Party or at the spring 1978 session of the National People's Congress), Peking has long been using all the propaganda means at its disposal to try to justify the need for accelerated growth of those branches of the Chinese economy which would promote the building of a "mighty" China capable of waging a modern war.

¹ *Jenminjhpao*, September 23, 1978.

Peking's daily ideological indoctrination which takes into account the present level of consciousness of the ordinary man, and the militarisation of the entire life of the country, which goes far beyond the requirements of the normal process of providing for the country's defense have a far-reaching aim. It is designed to bring up generations that are expansionist-minded unthinking executives and can be exploited by Peking for its own ends. History provides many examples of a similar poisoning of the minds of the masses; one recalls Hitler Germany with its Goebbels propaganda, or China's own "cultural revolution" with its mass Hungweiping psychosis and its cult of violence. The fact that the Chinese leadership does not command the necessary economic resources for achieving its hegemonic ambitions only intensifies the adventurism of its foreign policy which can go to any extreme.

CONCLUSION

A DANGER TO THE WORLD'S NATIONS

By their unprecedentedly cynical, criminal attack on socialist Vietnam, China's leaders have finally demonstrated to the world their extreme adventurism and the treacherous, aggressive nature of their policy. "It is clear to everybody now," said Leonid Brezhnev in his speech on March 2, 1979, "that it is precisely this policy that is the gravest threat to world peace. Never before has the danger of any connivance at this policy been so glaringly obvious."

One can easily imagine the catastrophic consequences that the realisation of Peking's great-power schemes would have for world nations. This is why there is growing awareness that its militarist plans and acts of aggression are a threat to all mankind, including the peoples of the capitalist countries.

There are, nevertheless, some high-ranking politicians in the West who do not wish to see the growing danger. Furthermore, they silently encourage Peking's aggressive actions.

Chinese leaders' policy may later become a threat to the security of the countries which are now selling or intend to sell arms and military equipment to China, those which are offering it

military technology in the hope of playing the "Chinese card" against the Soviet Union. The aggression against Vietnam graphically illustrates what the Chinese leaders have in mind when they try to obtain modern arms from the West. Obviously, not the interests of defence.